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DOES THE LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AFFECT TRANSPARENCY IN ARBITRAL
PROCEEDINGS?
Emily F. Ariz*
ABSTRACT
This note explores how the lack of binding precedent in both
international commercial and investment arbitration affects
transparency in arbitral proceedings. As arbitration increases in
popularity, its deficiencies have become more apparent. The lack of
binding precedent in arbitration is convenient in some ways, but
problematic as it leaves arbitrators an immense amount of discretion
when deciding cases. With many decisions unpublished to maintain
confidentiality and those decisions that are published sometimes lack
reasoning to support the award, transparency in arbitral proceedings
is practically nonexistent. In recent years, there is a trend toward more
transparency in certain types of arbitral disputes. In this Note, I argue
that while the lack of binding precedent in international arbitration
encourages arbitrators to decide cases too freely, which contributes to
the lack of transparency in arbitration, there are also many other
factors that contribute to this problematic feature of international
arbitration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a helpful tool for parties that want autonomy in
resolving their disputes. Parties can agree on procedural rules, choice
of law, location, and arbitrators among many other specifics when it
comes to arbitration.1 While arbitral proceedings are desirable for their
speedy and confidential nature, there is growing concern regarding
transparency in international arbitration.
The United States judicial system follows the legal doctrine of
stare decisis, which means that “a court must follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”2 Arbitral
awards do not have this same binding quality, meaning that
arbitrators do not have to follow prior arbitral awards when deciding
1

See Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in
Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 59 (2005).
2
Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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cases and that the award is only binding on the parties in that case.3 In
international commercial arbitration, arbitrators have controls in
place, mostly by way of the New York Convention, but have a lot of
freedom when issuing awards, as there is no clear practice for
following past awards in this field.4 The confidential nature of arbitral
awards means that many awards do not get published, leaving the
public to wonder on what grounds the award was issued. This is
especially significant because many commercial arbitration awards
will have an effect on public policy. This lack of transparency
contributes to the common characterization of international arbitration
as being “lawless.”5
In international commercial arbitration between private
parties, transparency of arbitral proceedings may seem irrelevant as
long as the dispute is resolved, but awards in international commercial
arbitration can be impactful on international public policy.6 For
example, governments will often take commonly arbitrated issues into
consideration when drafting free trade agreements or bilateral
investment treaties to protect domestic companies that have
international ventures, thus shaping their international economic
policies. Furthermore, arbitrators are selected by the parties to serve
the parties and have little incentive to consider third parties, like the
general public, in their decisions. 7 While there is a push in the
international arbitration community to make certain types of arbitral
proceedings, such as investor-state dispute settlement, more
transparent by publishing all awards, the lack of binding precedent
still limits transparency, as arbitrators are not obligated to give wellsupported legal reasoning in their awards.8

3

See Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?,
24 ARB. INT’L 357, 357, 361 (2007).
4
Id. at 362.
5
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. 187,
191 (2006).
6
William P. Graham, International Commercial Arbitration and International Public
Policy, in 81 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW) 372, 372 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987).
7
See Drahozal, supra note 5 at 192.
8
See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty § B, at 32
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 Model U.S. BIT] (stating that documents relating to arbitral
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Transparency has become a “buzzword” when discussing
international investment and arbitration law.9 There is a general
consensus that transparency is a good thing, necessary for social,
economic, international, and domestic systems to function in a
democratic way.10 In the context of international investment law and
international arbitration, questions of who is owed transparency and
in what respects become relevant. This largely depends on the type of
arbitration at hand. For example, in investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS), transparency with respect to award amounts and the reasoning
for the award should be publicly available to citizens of the country
involved in the dispute and for other companies looking to invest in
that host-state to learn from the mistakes of the investor.11 In
international commercial arbitration, transparency means that the
reasoning of awards should be available to provide predictability to
parties that regularly conduct international transactions subject to
arbitration.12
Even with a push for creating more transparency in
international arbitration, there is some information that should always
be confidential, which the public has no right to know. For example,
“trade secrets, confidential business information, state secrets, and
information protected by professional or other legal privilege” should
remain confidential as sensitive information.13 On the other hand,
there is plenty of information in which the public should know, or at
least have easily accessible, that is not. Some investment awards are
not publicly published, which infringes on the public’s right to know
how their government’s regulatory powers are affected.14
Furthermore, the general public, investors, and states all have interest
in knowing how arbitral tribunals interpret broadly applicable
proceedings must be made public); see also Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps.,
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules pt. C, ch. 4, reg. 22 (2006).
9
Andrea Bianchi, Transparency in International Law 142 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne
Peters eds., Cambridge Uni. Press 2013).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 160.
12
Id. at 161.
13
Id. at 159.
14
Id. at 160.
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investment treaties.15 From access to justice and public accountability
viewpoints, it is difficult to rationalize why arbitration proceedings in
most contexts are kept confidential.16 There is also a category of
information that is purposefully withheld for the advantage of the
party with that knowledge.17 An example of this would be large
international arbitration firms with extensive knowledge of individual
arbitrators gleaned from years of practice.18 Having knowledge of
which arbitrators are likely to persuade their co-arbitrators, which
arbitrators keep the cases moving quickly, and so on can provide those
large firms, and thus the parties they represent, a competitive
advantage when choosing arbitrators to adjudicate a dispute.19 While
some of this knowledge partially comes from experience, it also comes
from having a wealth of unpublished arbitral awards.20
The following sections will discuss the differences between
civil law system and common law systems in these respects,
specifically focusing on the role of precedent and prior case law in
those systems. This is to show how arbitration functions more
similarly to the civil law system in terms of binding precedent and how
the lack of binding case law can affect the transparency of a court or
tribunal’s decision.
II.

CIVIL LAW SYSTEM VERSUS COMMON LAW SYSTEM

A brief discussion of the differences between the civil law
system and the common law system will provide some historical
context and reasoning behind the lack of binding precedent in
international arbitration. The common law and civil law systems vary
in what is the “basis” for the law. Understanding the differences
between common law systems and civil law systems starts with an
understanding of stare decisis and jurisprudence constante.
Stare decisis is the rule, used in most common law systems, that
prior judicial decisions are binding law and must be applied to future,
15

Id.
Id.
17
Id. at 165.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
16

2021

FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

361

similarly situated cases. Jurisprudence constante, on the other hand, is
“defined as a series of adjudicated cases that establishes a consistent
and uniform application of a certain rule.”21 The key difference
between the two is the function of case law: under stare decisis, judicial
opinions are binding, whereas under jurisprudence constante, judicial
opinions are merely persuasive.22 Many argue that jurisprudence
constante informally exists in international arbitration, yet
international arbitration is still very ad hoc by nature; just because
arbitrators sometimes cite to precedent in their awards does not mean
it is a common practice or has been widely accepted. Tribunals “still
have complete discretion on how to interpret treaty provisions” and
other applicable law and “disregard the decisions of other tribunals.”23
Civil law is based on legislation, as opposed to common law,
which is based on judicial decisions. Of course, common law countries
also have legislation, but instead of being “formulated as general
principles” as civil law legislation is, common law legislation
“consist[s] rather of particular rules intended to control certain fact
situations specified with considerable detail.”24 This forces common
law systems to rely on judicial interpretation of legislation as a basis of
law.25 Civil law systems rely on legislation that is intentionally drafted
to be broadly applicable.26 This is not to say that civil law systems do
not take previous cases into account, but the degree of persuasiveness
is different depending on how many cases have been decided in a
uniform way.27 Single decisions do not bind courts in civil law
systems.28 As uniformity among cases increases overtime on a specific

21

Dumitru Filip, The Role of Legitimate Expectations in Establishing a Jurisprudence
Constante in International Investment Law, 5 MANCHESTER REV. L. CRIME & ETHICS
28, 30 (2016).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 28.
24
Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison,
15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 425 (1967).
25
Id. at 424.
26
Id.
27
Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A
Dynamic Analysis, George Mason University School of Law, Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 04-15 1, 6 (2004).
28
Id.
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issue, the more persuasive the case law becomes.29 Furthermore, civil
law systems give more deference to the legislative history of the laws,
taking legislators’ discussions and comments into account when
interpreting the law.30
These differences lay the basis for differentiating between
binding precedent and non-binding precedent. Arbitration very much
follows the civil law tradition where “courts are not bound to follow
previous judicial decisions.”31 Like civil law courts, arbitrators
adjudicate cases based on the general principles of the applicable law,
rather than looking at how prior, similar disputes were decided like
the common law system would provide for.32 The question then
becomes: is it fair and equitable, as arbitration usually places emphasis
on, for common law to be adjudicated in a forum where decisions are
made in the way of a civil law system? Using an example to state it
more clearly: should laws of the United States, which may be the
applicable law of arbitration, be decided on its “general principles” in
arbitration, when the laws were not designed to be adjudicated in that
way? This is just another issue that affects the transparency of
arbitration.
A few questions that arise when contemplating how the
common law and civil law systems compare and fit into arbitration
include how civil law systems maintain transparency and consistency
without binding precedent and whether the common law system is
really “transparent.” The following sections will discuss these
questions in depth.
a.
How Do Civil Law Countries Maintain Transparency
without Binding Precedent?
Countries with civil law systems maintain a degree of
transparency in their judicial proceedings without following
precedent in several ways, some of which are attainable for arbitral
tribunals. Some ways that civil law systems preserve transparency are
through the judicial appointment process, judicial financial
29

Id.
Dainow, supra note 20, at 424.
31
Id. at 426.
32
Id.
30
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disclosures, and public access to judicial decisions.33 The judicial
selection and appointment process varies widely across different legal
systems, but despite the exact mechanics of this process, the standards
for judges are typically consistent.34 Some factors and principles
considered include objective, merit-based appointments, looking at
professional standing, the experience level, and necessary legal skills
of the individual candidates.35 Having an open process can discourage
the influence of external forces or other branches of government.36
Similar standards should be utilized by arbitrators.37 The ability of
arbitrators is rarely called into question, but when it is, the entire
award may be thrown out, forcing the parties to start from scratch.
Thoroughly vetting arbitrators is a crucial step in arbitration that
allows the parties to secure a level of stability and transparency in the
proceedings.
Judicial financial disclosures refers to the requiring public
officials, like judges, filing an asset and income disclosure statement.38
This creates a sense of trust in public administration by being open
about any potential conflicts of interest or any bribery.39 Applying this
principle to arbitration would be more difficult, as there is already a
duty to disclose conflicts of interest imposed upon arbitrators. Because
the public accountability factor is minimized with arbitrators, this
requirement is not as essential, but requiring arbitrators to continue to
disclose any conflicts of interest clearly still is.40
Publishing judicial decisions is “a vital element in preventing
perceptions of secrecy and lack of accountability, which can in turn
generate distrust and confusion amongst the public.”41As discussed at
length, availability and accessibility of judicial decisions allows
33

Clifton Johnson, The Development of the Court Administration: Directions and
Model, INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE (Jun. 14, 2018), https://www.idlo.
int/news/speeches-and-advocacy/enhancing-judicial-transparency-and-promoting-pu
blic-trust.
34
See id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See id.
41
Id.
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judiciaries to provide clarity and consistency within their legal
system.42 Applying the same principle to arbitration is simple.
Publishing awards will foster consistency, even if stare decisis is not the
presiding rule.
These are just a few ways that international arbitration can
become more transparent as it already mirrors the civil
system more closely than it does the common law system.
b.

Is the Common Law System Really Transparent?

While the common law approach uses stare decisis to provides
stability and predictability, the transparency of decisions may be
questioned.43 Judicial decisions continuously building upon each other
and being able to find case law on almost any issue provides a certain
foundation and stability that enables the common law systems to
function.44 Yet, the common law system may not be as transparent as
it boasts.
Another issue with some common law jurisdictions,
specifically the United States, is that not all judges are selected and
appointed through a transparent process. While some judges in the
United States are voted in, federal judges and Supreme Court judges
are appointed by the president. This clearly give another branch of the
government, the executive branch, power and influence over the
judiciary.
Judges in common law systems simply follow whatever prior
case law says, unless there is good reason, like outdated cases, to
overrule the previously established law. There is the argument that
judges do not thoroughly think through their decisions under this
model as they feel an obligation to stick with precedent.45 Furthermore,
when the case law is already established, there is less of a need to
reason and explain why a case comes out a certain way.46 While this
42

Id.
See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
44
See id.
45
See generally id.
46
See generally id.
43
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may offer stability and predictability in the legal system, it makes it
very difficult to change any settled case law. This inflexibility of the
system can allow for injustice for years until a case makes it to a higher
court to be overturned.
The following sections will discuss two types of arbitration
and how the lack of binding precedent has negatively affected the
transparency of arbitral outcomes. Specifically, this section focuses on
the role of the fair and equitable treatment standard, a legal standard
commonly used in investment arbitration, in arbitrator’s decisions and
that has not been fully developed as a result of a lack of binding
precedent. As demonstrated below, this underdevelopment has led to
awards that have not been thoroughly reasoned and lack
transparency.
III.

TYPES OF ARBITRATION

There are several different types of arbitration, and usually the
level of transparency is determined by the type of arbitration. For
example, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is typical more
transparent than commercial arbitration because almost every opinion
is published. But even if the opinion is published, does not mean that
the arbitrator necessarily explain the reasoning behind their decisions.
This following section will focus on the ISDS system and how the
inconsistency of interpretation of law and the freedom given to
arbitrators in deciding their awards can have disproportionate and
unrationalized consequences that negatively affect states and their
citizens.
a.

What is ISDS?

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is a critical part of
foreign investment. The ISDS system promotes foreign investment by
providing investors with the confidence that their investments will be
protected, and any associated disputes will be fairly resolved. Without
an agreement on how to settle disputes between a host state and
foreign private investor, the dispute would normally be handled by a
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domestic court of the host country.47 Foreign investors find this
disadvantageous as those courts are typically bound by domestic law,
which may not protect the investor’s rights under international law.48
Additionally, investors often believe that the host state’s courts will
not be impartial when settling the dispute. Submitting to arbitration is
also beneficial for the host state as it can “protect itself against other
forums for foreign or international litigation.”49 Arbitration is typically
more efficient that traditional litigation, benefitting both the host state
and investor who seek a speedy resolution. Finally, “[e]quating the
private investment interests with those of the entire nation could
ultimately lead to tensions that threaten the peace in the modern
world.”50 One of the most important benefits of ISDS is that it
depoliticizes the dispute and “reduces unnecessary diplomatic friction
in the area of investment . . . by broadening the legal context into a
wider arena of global economic interest, not merely the particular two
national entities involved in a given case.”51
i.

The Role of International Treaties in ISDS

International treaties are how countries agree to ISDS. These
include free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) which include provisions that enable an aggrieved investor with
an investment in territory of a foreign host government to bring a claim
against that government for breach of an investment agreement before
an international arbitration panel.
A free trade agreement is “an agreement between two or more
countries where the countries agree on certain obligations that affect
trade in goods and services, and protections for investors and
intellectual property rights.”52 The goal of FTAs is to reduce or

47

Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Paradigm, 10 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 725, 734 (2007).
48
Id. at 735.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 736.
51
Id.
52
International Trade Administration (Department of Commerce), Free Trade
Agreement Overview, https://www.trade.gov/free-trade-agreement-overview.
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eliminate trade barriers, which in turn encourages international
trade.53
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are agreements that lay out
the terms for private investment in foreign countries. Typically, BITs
are drafted to protect private investors rather than the host countries,
in an effort to encourage more private investment in foreign
countries.54 Under most United States BITs, and FTAs, protected
property includes moveable and immoveable property, tangible and
intangible assets, and intellectual property. The purpose of these
investment agreements is to protect investments from expropriation,
political risk such as a change in government, or revocation of permits,
among other risks that come with foreign investment.
ii. Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment
Law
The fair and equitable treatment standard (FET) is the basis for
many ISDS claims. The standard has its origins in the 1948 Havana
Charter for an International Trade Organization.55 The standard is meant
to protect investors from instances of “arbitrary, discriminatory, or
abusive content by host states.”56 However, the standard is often
critiqued for being too vague and does not provide enough guidance
to arbitrators, thus giving arbitrators too much discretion in their
decision making.57 This uncertainty in application and interpretation
of the standard leads to concern when the FET standard is used in the
context of ISDS because it can “restrict host-country administrative

53

Id.
Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties.
55
Directorate for Financial And Enterprise Affairs, Fair and Equitable Treatment
Standard in International Investment Law, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 3 (2004), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment
-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf.
56
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fair and Equitable
Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II,
UNITED NATIONS 1, 1 (2012), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/uncta
ddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf.
57
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, supra note 51 at 2-3.
54
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and governmental action to a degree that threatens the policymaking
autonomy of that country.”58
The general rule for the FET standard that has developed over
the years is that the host-state must provide stability and predictability
consistent with customary international law. There are clear instances
where State conduct would constitute a violation of the standard
including: (1) defeating investors’ legitimate expectations (in balance
with the host State’s right to regulate in public interest); (2) denial of
justice and due process; (3) manifest arbitrariness in decision-making;
(4) discrimination; and (5) outright abusive treatment.59
These key elements of the FET standard have been identified
and developed by arbitral tribunals. The first is the protections of
investors’ legitimate expectations, which is closely tied to changes that
effect the investment.60 As foreign investment typically involves
projects with long durations, changes to the business environment,
how the host-state is involved in those changes, and what the hoststate will do to safeguard the investment in the event of a change is
crucial to investor’s expectations.61 The second element is denial of
justice and due process. While it is nearly impossible to define all
instances that would constitute denial of justice and due process, the
tribunal will likely consider the following in its determination: (1)
denial of access to justice and the refusal of courts to decide; (2)
unreasonable delay in proceedings; (3) lack of a court’s independence
from the legislative and the executive branches of the State; (4) failure
to execute final judgments or arbitral awards; (5) corruption of a judge;
(6) discrimination against the foreign litigant; (7) breach of
fundamental due process guarantees.62 The next element is manifest
arbitrariness, which focuses on the motivations and objective behind
the conduct at issue in arbitration.63 The fourth element is
discrimination, which is straightforward as it “prohibits
discrimination against foreign investors and their investments.”64 The
58

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 52 at 1.
Id. at 62.
60
Id. at 63.
61
See Id.
62
Id. at 80.
63
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra n. 2 at 78.
64
Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
59
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final elements is abusive treatment, which includes conduct
constituting “coercion, duress and harassment that involve
unwarranted and improper pressure, abuse of power, persecution,
threats, intimidation and use of force.”65 Because the FET standard is
essentially a catch-all for any host-states’ conduct that would
jeopardize stability and predictability, it is one of the most common
allegations to trigger ISDS proceedings.
iii. Expropriation in International Investment Law
Expropriation is the taking of aliens’ property without
adequate compensation, regardless of whether the property was taken
for a public purpose or not.66 While direct expropriation through
nationalization was common in the 1970s and 1980s, now investors are
threatened by indirect expropriation.67 Indirect expropriation most
commonly occurs when host-states’ domestic policies interfere with
foreign investment, which includes regulatory schemes aimed at
protecting the environment, public health, or other public welfare
interests.68 With the nature of ISDS that allows for investors to bring
such expropriation claims under the FET standard, this in concerning
as increasingly, investors’ rights are put before public interest.
iv. Public Interest Policies’ Effect on ISDS
As previously mentioned, FTAs and BITs are increasingly
being interpreted to prioritize investors’ rights in protecting their
investments in foreign states. Although ISDS is a useful tool for solving
disputes that arise between states and investors, the system
“fundamentally shifts the balance of power among investors, States,
and the general public” while diminishing the “rights of governments
to regulate.”69 This balance of power is shifted because ISDS elevates
65

Id. at 82.
See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Indirect
Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, OECD
WORKING PAPERS ON INT’L INV. 1, 3 (2004).
67
Id. at 2.
68
Id.
69
Public Citizen, Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies, 1,
1 (2015).
66
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investors to the same status as sovereign governments and allows
them to “privately enforce a public treaty.”70 It may be assumed that
states involved in ISDS proceedings represent the interests of its
citizens, but the interests of the general public and states’ governments
are not always aligned, leaving individuals that would be greatly
affected by ISDS awards without representation in the dispute. The
following section will detail several ISDS cases from recent years to
demonstrate that investors typically win these cases due to the vague
and low threshold of the FET standard.
v. ISDS Attacks on Public Interest Policies
The first case is Metalclad v. Mexico. This case related to toxic
waste and ended in an investor win where the investor was awarded
$16.2 million.71 These proceedings occurred while NAFTA was still
effective, which included a FET clause.72 Here, the Metalclad was
denied permits for expansion of its toxic waste facility by a Mexican
municipality government which cited concerns of water
contamination and environmental and health hazards as the reasons
for denial.73 Denial of these permits was deemed expropriation under
the FET standard, even though the municipal government denied the
same permits to the Mexican company from which Metalclad acquired
the facility.74 Mexico had to pay Metalclad for the diminution in value
of its investment without proper compensation.75
The next case deals with an oil concession contract in Occidental
Petroleum v. Ecuador. This case is particularly shocking as the arbitral
tribunal imposed a standard that was not included in the BIT
regarding the FET standard.76 Here, Occidental “illegally sold 40
percent of its production rights of its another firm without government
approval,” which not only violated the contract between the parties,
but also violated Ecuador’s hydrocarbon laws.77 The tribunal
70

Id.
Id. at 8.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 5–6.
77
Id. at 5.
71
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acknowledges that Occidental broke the law, but stated that the
Ecuadorian government did not respond proportionally to the breach
of contract by terminating the agreement.78 This disproportionate
reaction was deemed a violation of the FET standard and the tribunal
awarded Occidental with $2.3 billion.79 This amount was later reduced
to $1.4 billion, “reducing the damages that had been based on the 40
percent share that had been sold,” which still left a sizable hole
Ecuador’s pockets.80
Abengoa v. Mexico is another toxic waste case, but actually
involves the public demanding protection from environmental
harms.81 This dispute fell under the Spain-Mexico BIT and the claim
was filed by the Company alleging that it could not operate its waste
management facility in Mexico because the local community strongly
opposed it.82 The waste management facility would put the already
contaminated area at further risk for environmental harm.83 The local
government revoked Abengoa’s land use permit as a result of the
public opposition, but the matter continued to escalate.84 Finally, the
city council fully shut down the site and explained that it “did not
comply with public policy.”85 The arbitral tribunal found that the
revocation of the license amounted to indirect expropriation and
therefore “ordered Mexico to pay Abengoa more than $40 million, plus
interest, as compensation for its expected future profits from the waste
plant and to cover half of the corporation’s own tribunal and legal
costs.”86
The final case discussed is Azurix v. Argentina, which falls
under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.87 Azurix made a 30-year deal with
Argentina to provide water and sewage treatment to 2.5 million
people.88 Within months, the local governments advised citizens not to
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drink or pay for the water services, which led to civil unrest.89 The
government and Azurix tried to blame each other for the algae
contamination causing the unclean water, yet more problems arose.90
Azurix over-billed citizens and was responsible for several water
outages. After withdrawing from the deal, Azurix filed a claim stating
that it did not receive fair and equitable treatment because the
government did not allow it to raise rates and did not invest enough
money into the water infrastructure.91 The tribunal considered
“whether legitimate public interest policies could constitute BIT
violations,” but ultimately found that Argentina’s conduct violated the
FET standard.92 Azurix walked away with $165 million, plus interest,
and covered most of the tribunal’s costs.93
These cases are just a microcosm of the ISDS cases in which
investors are awarded millions, or even billions, of dollars due to the
vagueness and seemingly low threshold of what fair and equitable
means under the FET standard. If the FET standard was more
thoroughly developed, the application of the standard would be more
uniform and predictable. This would occur if arbitrators had to follow
previous interpretations of the standard and build upon those the
interpretations to create a clearer guideline for how the standard
applies to each case. Taxpayers in mostly poor countries end up paying
the cost of these awards, even when the public clearly opposes some
of the “investments.” While investors’ rights are important, equally
important is the incentive to implement policies in favor of public
interest, especially with respect to public international and domestic
policy.
vi. The Future of ISDS
ISDS has become an integral part of international investment
law, however there may be more limits on ISDS in future agreements.
Moving toward a dispute resolution system that allows host-states to
control public interest policies while maintaining investors’ rights will
89
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take time, as many of the agreements that prop up ISDS will likely not
be revised or replaced anytime soon. But small shifts toward
eliminating ISDS are already happening in the international
investment world. For example, NAFTA’s replacement agreement,
USMCA, between the United States, Mexico, and Canada that
establishes a free trade area that limits the use of ISDS.94 No American
investors can initiate ISDS proceedings against Canada and the
availability of ISDS between the United States and Mexico is limited to
certain sectors.95 As a new agreement among powerful states in the
western hemisphere, USMCA may set precedent in moving away from
ISDS and finding or creating a dispute resolution system that takes
public interest into account during decision making.
b.

International Commercial Arbitration

Another common type of arbitration is international
commercial arbitration. International commercial arbitration has been
a preferred method of dispute resolution in the “cross-border context”
for many decades, as it offers a way for parties to customize the way
in which disputes are resolved—as was previously discussed towards
the beginning of this paper—by having choice of law provisions,
choice of procedure and rules governing arbitration provisions, and
being able to choose the arbitrators and location of arbitration.96
Finally, the most attractive draw for large companies is the privacy of
arbitration.
As discussed earlier, most international commercial arbitral
awards are kept confidential, so those awards cannot be analyzed in
the same way that ISDS awards are. Additionally, the confidentiality
of international commercial arbitral awards means that those awards
have less of an impact on public policy. Nonetheless, international
commercial arbitration is relevant to the topic of lack of precedent, as
these arbitral awards are not always based in precedent. Again, this
94
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lack of set precedent in international commercial arbitration
contributes to decreased transparency in the system. The following
section will discuss how the lack of binding precedent may be
necessary in the context of international commercial arbitration.
IV.
IS THIS LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT NECESSARY OR
PROBLEMATIC?
This is undoubtedly a loaded question, dependent on many
factors. It is well-known that arbitrators often do not apply the law.
Many arbitral decisions are “based on principles of equity and fairness,
rather than legal obligation.”97 An arbitrator’s authority comes from a
contract between the parties, so assuming the contract is valid, the
parties assent to comply with the arbitrator’s decision whether or not
the arbitrator applies the law.98 Thus because the arbitrator works
directly for the parties, there is more incentive to reach a decision that
may be preferred by the parties rather than one that strictly follows the
law.99 Some argue that in an effort to have an award “be enforceable
in all jurisdictions where review is likely,” arbitrators try to conform
with the rule of law as a vacated award would put the parties back
where there started with the dispute.100 However, arbitral decisions
are typically reviewed on procedural, not substantive, grounds
making the arbitrator’s incentive to avoid a vacated award weak.101
It may seem backward that arbitrators do not always apply
law, but this is exactly why the parties agreed to arbitrate in the first
place. In international arbitration, the law applicable to case may be
uncertain if it is not agreed upon in advance through a contract.
Furthermore, designating a party’s domestic law as the applicable law
in arbitral proceedings beforehand may disadvantage the other party
because the parties come from different countries with different legal
systems.102 The arbitrator is there to settle the dispute as quickly and
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amicably as possible, so getting caught up in the specifics of applicable
law or conflicts of law issues goes against the goals of arbitration.
The lack of binding precedent in international arbitration not
only affects transparency but also negatively impacts the development
of law. When parties decide to arbitrate, “they remove the case from
the public court system,” which means that no court will decide the
issue, there will most likely not be a published opinion, and it will not
serve as binding precedent for similarly situated litigants in the
future.103 In addition to being unpublished, arbitral awards may not
provide reasoning as to how the arbitrator reached the decision,
further justifying why arbitral awards cannot be a substitute for
binding precedent.104 Finally, the lack of binding precedent means that
there are likely conflicting awards which causes inconsistency and
confusion.105 Attorneys preparing for arbitration may find it difficult
to formulate arguments based on past cases because there may be
several similar cases with different outcomes. This allows parties to
walk blindly into arbitration without any certainty in the strength of
their arguments. As international arbitration does not allow the public
judicial system to adjudicate novel legal issues, this impedes national
judicial systems from further developing their own jurisprudence.
A less critical view is one that finds this lack of binding
precedent necessary. Because each issue adjudicated in international
arbitration is so different, binding precedent could lead to injustice in
cases that turn on fact-specific inquiries.106 In international commercial
arbitration specifically, disputes are so fact- and contract-driven that
the need for developing consistent rules is nonexistent.107 In contrast,
international sports arbitration requires “the development of
consistent rules through arbitral awards” because there is an incentive
for equal treatment of every player as the sports arbitration normally
deals with recurrent issues.108 Additionally, international sports
arbitration has governing bodies, the international federations, that
can substantively review arbitral awards, creating a meaningful check
103
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on the arbitrator’s power.109 With independent tribunals dealing with
various types of arbitral matters and no designated supervisory
institution, it seems the lack of binding precedent is a necessity, as
instituting a system for binding precedent would shake the core of the
system.110
V.

HOW DOES THIS LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT AFFECT
TRANSPARENCY ?
As previously mentioned, arbitrators do not have to provide
any reasoning for their decisions. A perfect example is Occidental
Petroleum v. Ecuador. The arbitral tribunal imposed a standard that was
not included in the bilateral investment treaty, without reason.111 The
tribunal’s ability to seemingly concoct rules and arguments from thin
air makes arbitration unpredictable. If there were binding precedent,
or at the very least recognized jurisprudence constante, the arbitrators
would at least have to distinguish or analogize the case in front of them
with precedent to explain why they are or are not following precedent.
This is an example of how even with published decisions, arbitral
proceedings cannot achieve complete transparency because the
reasoning of a published award may not have any grounding in law.
Published decisions are just one step to increasing transparency.
Without providing reasoning, interested parties such as states,
investors, and the general public have no guidance on how a tribunal
came to its decision on the award.
Furthermore, there are limited to no checks on the arbitrators’
power in arbitral proceedings. The arbitrators’ award is law. While the
arbitral tribunal must follow the procedural rules chosen by the
parties, almost every other part of conducting the proceedings may be
at the discretion of the tribunal. Arbitration awards are typically only
reviewed on procedural, not substantive grounds.112 For example,
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most arbitral awards are only subject to review in the event that an
arbitrator is deemed unable to make an unbiased decision. If there
were binding precedent, arbitrators would have to follow previous
law in their decisions, which arguably makes the decision more
objective. This again goes back to imposing a duty upon arbitral
tribunals to provide reasoning for their awards to increase
transparency.
VI.

SHOULD THERE BE MORE TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION ?

Privacy of proceedings is one reason why international
arbitration is so popular, especially with large corporations and
governments through ISDS. Arbitral awards are not typically
published, and the parties typically sign a non-disclosure agreement,
so the awards are not made public.
The process of seeking enforcement of awards in a country’s
judicial system does not necessarily aid in increasing transparency,
because arbitral awards are usually only evaluated on a procedural,
not substantive basis.113 So even if a party seeks enforcement, the
state’s court will likely not review the award because it will only have
the resources and jurisdiction to enforce it. One way to encourage
transparency may be through the creation of an appeals process,
allowing other arbitrators to review decisions on a substantive basis.
Finally, one way to encourage transparency without
completely compromising confidentiality may be to allow more thirdparty intervention in proceedings. If a third-party can prove the
decision would directly affect it, the third party would be allowed to
participate in the proceedings.114 The allowance of amicus curiae
briefs, briefs submitted by non-parties to other more information or
expertise on a specific issue, are increasingly popular and important in
international arbitration proceedings as the push for transparency
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becomes more urgent.115 While amici curiae remain crucial, the actual
intervention of interested parties would be more influential. Of course,
there would have to be an established standard as to who is considered
an interested party, but this may be a powerful tool for interested nonparties to meaningfully participate in arbitral proceedings.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As the international arbitration community continues to
recognize the increasing need for transparency in arbitration
proceedings, there are several options to consider in the potential
reform of international arbitration.116 While establishing binding
precedent may contribute to transparency more quickly there are
several other innovative ways to encourage transparency in
international arbitration including publishing awards, having
established jurisprudence constante, allowing for third-party
interventions, and creating an appeals process. As long-standing
investment treaties are being re-thought, re-worked, and re-negotiated
by world leaders, the principle of transparency and the many ways to
inspire it need to be front of mind.
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